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Chapter 6 
The Commission and 
institutional reforms
The period between 1986 and 2000 constituted 
the most intensive period of formalised institu­
tional change in the history of the European in­
tegration process. It began, after all, with the ink 
barely dry on the Single European Act (SEA)  — 
the treaty had been agreed in December 1985 but 
would not be signed until February 1986  — and 
ended with the agreement, in December 2000, on 
the Treaty of Nice. In between lay the Treaty on 
European  Union, better known as the Maastricht 
Treaty, which was signed in 1992, and the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, signed in 1997. And each of these 
legal milestones required extensive preparation and 
negotiation, to say nothing of the almost equally 
intensive effort to implement, to fine­tune and to 
follow up. It is thus no exaggeration to say that, 
throughout the period discussed in this book, the 
debate rumbled on about European Community/
Union (EC/EU) institutional change, about the 
shortcomings of the institutional status quo and 
about how the European system ought to change 
in order to meet its massively increased range of 
tasks and cope with its ever growing membership.
Unsurprisingly the European Commission was 
at the heart of this debate, both as an object of 
discussion  — in other words one of the institu­
tions whose shape, powers and prerogatives were 
at  issue — and still more as an active participant 
in the intellectual exploration of how the Euro­
pean system could be improved. It had long sought 
 treaty change, with previous Commission Presi­
dents feeling frustrated at the rigidities of an insti­
tutional system that the Member States refused to 
alter, formally at least (1). It therefore threw itself 
with great enthusiasm into the discussion and ne­
gotiation of treaty change, once the floodgates for 
reform seemed to have been opened by the SEA. 
As will become clear from the pages that follow, 
(1) See for example the chapters on Jenkins and Thorn in Harst, J. (van der) 
and Voerman, G. (eds), An impossible job? — The Presidents of the European 
Commission, 1985-2014, John Harper Publishing, London, 2015.
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the Delors, Santer and Prodi Commissions all en­
gaged seriously and with substantial energy with 
both the broader discussion about what shape 
Europe’s institutions should take and the more 
detailed work of the multiple intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs) convened during this period to 
carry out the task of treaty alteration. In the pro­
cess they were able to secure a series of important 
changes, helping to steer through a massive broad­
ening of the policy range of the EC/EU and utterly 
transforming the standing and powers of its core 
institutions. The European system of 2001 was 
 institutionally very different from that of 1985.
Alongside the indisputable range of achievements, 
however, there also developed a sense of frustra­
tion about the inability of the EC/EU to move 
ahead as far and as fast as many within the Euro­
pean Commission had hoped. Dismay at what had 
not been done began to outweigh satisfaction with 
what had been achieved, not least because very real 
doubts remained, in the Commission and else­
where, about whether the institutional system was 
strong enough and effective enough to cope with 
the vastly extended policy remit and the massively 
increased membership expected in the early years 
of the 21st century (1). The failure of these multiple 
rounds of European treaty reform to capture the 
imagination and support of the European public 
was also a preoccupation  — the ratification pro­
cess of each new set of European treaties became 
seemingly ever more fraught, not least because of 
the increasing recourse by Member States to refer­
enda, the positive outcome of which was far from 
guaranteed. By December 2000  Prodi’s  assessment 
(1) The sensitivity of this subject was highlighted by the Commission’s 
own hesitancy about the institutional implications of enlargement. Its 
1992 report on ‘Europe and the challenge of enlargement’ was much 
less precise and far reaching than Frans Andriessen, its main  author, 
would have liked, largely because his colleagues preferred  caution to 
boldness in the uncertain atmosphere caused by the Danish  rejection 
of the Maastricht Treaty. ‘Europe and the challenge of enlarge­
ment’, Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement, No  3, 1992. 
For the lengthy internal debates on both see HAEC, COM(92), Minutes 
No 1108, meeting of 3 June 1992; COM(92), Minutes No 1110, 17 June 
1992. The watered­down text had little impact at European Council level.
of the Treaty of Nice thus was not only rather 
 ambivalent, with disappointment at the missed 
opportunity mixed in with satisfaction at the 
changes that had been agreed, but was also accom­
panied by a clear­cut call for the EU to adopt a rad­
ically different approach to future treaty change. 
The course had been set for the Euro pean Conven­
tion of 2002­2003 and for the ill­fated European 
constitution to which it gave rise. The section that 
follows will thus not only look briefly at how the 
Commission approached each episode of  treaty 
change and at its assessment of what had been 
achieved, but also at its mounting dissatisfaction 
at the pace and manner of European institutional 
advance.
It is of course true that the European Commission 
is almost bound to complain about Member States’ 
caution with regard to treaty change. Jacques 
 Delors’s initial assessment of the SEA was highly 
cautious, describing it as an example of ‘Europe of 
the feasible’ rather than ‘Europe of the ideal’ (2). 
But such misgivings had soon been swept away 
by the extraordinary acceleration in the pace of 
Euro pean integration over the years that followed. 
Rather than a pragmatic and tentative advance, 
the SEA was soon being viewed as the crucial point 
of departure for the European boom of the late 
1980s. Delors would retrospectively  describe it as 
his favourite treaty (3).
This highly positive view of treaty change helps 
explain the enthusiasm with which Delors and 
his team greeted the 1990 decisions to convene 
two new IGCs: one to explore the treaty changes 
required by the push for economic and monetary 
union, the other to flank economic and monetary 
union with an advance towards political union. 
(2) ‘1985­86 session — Report of proceedings from 9 to 13 December 1985’, 
Annex to the Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the 
European Parliament, No 2­333, pp. 124­128.
(3) Interview with Jacques Delors, 16  December 2009: https://www.cvce.
eu/en/histoire­orale/unit­content/­/unit/07f58085­4b00­405f­a403­
a603c1397fd5/93a99c2a­41bb­4450­b16f­600e84bc05d1/Resources#­
20f3eefc­fc4c­43e0­9e0d­e457ba9f368b_en&overlay
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The Commission was certainly very keen to em­
phasise the importance of boldness in each of the 
IGCs. Its October 1990 opinion on political  union 
underlined how central parallel progress was: ‘The 
osmosis between economic, social, financial and 
monetary policy on the one hand and foreign pol­
icy on the other is and should continue to be the 
underlying philosophy of a European Union, as 
 affirmed in the preamble to the Single Act’ (1).
But it was also prepared to accept that some­
what different institutional arrangements could 
be  devised for different policy areas: the opinion 
(1) European Commission, Political union, Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1990, p. 11.
recognised for instance that in external affairs the 
Commission’s right of initiative should be shared 
with the Council presidency and the Member 
States (2). There was pragmatism as well as enthu­
siasm as the negotiating process began. Notable 
too was the calibre of Commission participation 
in the IGC, with the President himself and two of 
his Vice­Presidents, Henning Christophersen (for 
Economic and Monetary Union) and Frans An­
driessen (for Political Union), deeply involved. The 
progress of the IGC was a frequent topic for debate 
during the weekly Commission meetings, espe­
cially as the talks neared their climax in late 1991, 
(2) Ibid., p. 15.
Frans Andriessen participated with Jacques Delors in the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union in 1991. 
From right to left, sitting at the table: Frans Andriessen, Vice-President, Jacques Delors, President and Pascal Lamy, head of cabinet 
of Jacques Delors, speaking to the President.
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Subsidiarity: the emergence of a new Community term
One of the most striking features of the debate about 
institutional change in the EC/EU in the 1990s was the 
prominence of the concept of ‘subsidiarity’. First given 
official status within the EU by Article 3b of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the term was used extensively 
during the subsequent decade. And Jacques Delors 
seems to have played an important role in its 
emergence as a key idea within the context of 
European integration.
The Maastricht Treaty article introducing the notion 
reads as follows:
‘The Community shall act within the limits of 
the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and 
of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Community shall take action, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, 
only if and in so far as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty.’
Subsidiarity was therefore being defined as the idea 
that power should be exercised at the lowest level of 
government possible. European action was thus 
something that should only happen where national 
measures — or indeed subnational measures — were 
likely to prove inadequate. Article 3b in other words 
was intended to reassure governments in the Member 
States, and perhaps more importantly the European 
public, that unchecked and unlimited EC/EU 
interference would not occur.
The concept was not entirely new. First developed in 
Catholic social doctrine during the 1930s, the term 
had then been picked up in the debate about German 
federalism and the relations between the federal 
government and the Länder in post-war West 
Germany (1). From there it had edged into the margins 
of discussions about European integration, appearing 
(1) Marquardt, P. D., ‘Subsidiarity and sovereignty in the European 
Union’, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 18, No 2, The 
Berkeley Electronic Press, New York, 1994, pp. 618-620: https://
pdfs.semanticscholar.org/50f3/0b01ddaed0b31b0206ed-
3da14e8462476d2e.pdf 
notably in the preamble to the European Parliament’s 
draft treaty on European Union in 1984 (2). But the 
next move had come from the Commission President. 
Reportedly influenced by a meeting he had had with 
German Länder leaders in 1988, Delors first used the 
idea publicly in a speech to the European Parliament in 
January 1989, before incorporating it into the 
Commission’s institutional suggestions to the 
intergovernmental conference (3). Politically the idea 
was attractive at a time of mounting disquiet about 
Commission activism and ambition; there were clear 
limits to how much Delors wanted his institution to do, 
he appeared to be saying. The idea was well received, 
with a special working group formed at the 
intergovernmental conference to explore the concept.
Subsidiarity only grew in importance as the Maastricht 
Treaty proved difficult to ratify. Revealingly, Delors put 
the concept at the forefront of his suggestions as to 
how the Commission should respond to the 
widespread sense of malaise caused by the Danish 
rejection of the new treaty and the troubled ratification 
process in the United Kingdom (4). Neither the Danish 
Commissioner nor those from the United Kingdom 
were wholly convinced that subsidiarity held the key to 
reversing Euroscepticism in their homelands, but the 
Commission pressed ahead regardless (5). In a 
communication to the Council in October 1992 the 
Commission placed subsidiarity alongside greater 
transparency and improved democratic control at the 
heart of its priorities for the future development of EC 
legislation (6). And over subsequent years it would 
report regularly to the Council on the adaptation of 
Community legislation to the subsidiarity principle (7). 
All directorates-general were also instructed to 
(2) ‘Draft treaty establishing the European Union’, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, No 1/2, 1984, pp. 7-28.
(3) Schaefer, G. F., ‘Institutional choices: the rise and fall of subsidi-
arity’, Futures, Vol. 23, No 7, Elsevier, New York, 1991, pp. 681-
694; ‘Statement on the broad lines of Commission policy pre-
sented by Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, to the 
European Parliament and reply to the ensuing Parliamentary 
debate — Strasbourg, 17 and 18 January 1989’, Bulletin of the 
European Communities Supplement, No 1, 1989.
(4) HAEC, COM(92), Minutes No 1123, second part, meeting of 
12 October 1992.
(5) HAEC, COM(92), Minutes No 1123, meeting of 12 October 1992.
(6) SEC(92) 1990 final, 27 October 1992, ‘The principle of subsidi-
arity’.
(7) See for example COM(93) 545 final, 24 November 1993, 
‘Commission report to the European Council on the adapta-
tion of Community legislation to the subsidiarity principle; or 
COM(94) 533 final, 25 November 1994, ‘Report to the European 
Council on the application of the subsidiarity principle 1994’.
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as well as being the subject of at least one ‘discus­
sion seminar’ (1). Despite the frequent exchange of 
views and some divergence of opinion, Delors kept 
a firm hand on the public expression of the Com­
mission’s position, for instance taking personal re­
sponsibility in the drafting of the document that 
the Commission submitted in late November 1991 
reiterating the institution’s priorities and warning 
against what it saw as the wrong turns that the 
 negotiators were in danger of taking (2). 
Despite its efforts, however, the treaty outcome was 
not wholly to the Commission’s liking (3). Both to 
his Commission colleagues and in public, Delors 
was able to emphasise much that was positive  (4). 
In Strasbourg he asserted that: ‘An irrevoc able, 
progressive and strict commitment has been made 
to economic and monetary union’ (5). Similarly, if 
more surprisingly, he also hailed the ‘major step for­
ward’ made over defence. And much was made of 
the potential for advances in the social policy field, 
albeit among 11 Member States rather than 12 be­
cause of the United Kingdom’s opt­out. Delors had 
positive words too about the increase in power of 
the European Parliament — an important element 
in making the European project democratically le­
gitimate  — and the fact that the Parliament and 
the Commission would now be coterminous. But 
he was equally frank about the disappointments: 
the rules drawn up for the common foreign and 
secur ity policy were inadequate; qualified major­
ity voting had not been extended sufficiently; and, 
(1) See for example HAEC, COM(91), Minutes No 1082, second part, meet­
ing of 14  November 1991; COM(91), Minutes No  1084, second part, 
27   November 1991; COM(91), Minutes No  1085, 4  December 1991; 
COM(91), Minutes No 1086, second part, 11 December 1991.
(2) Press release IP/91/1063, ‘Declaration of the Commission on the two 
 Intergovernmental Conferences on Political Union and on Economic and 
 Monetary Union’, 27  November 1991: http://europa.eu/rapid/press­re­
lease_IP­91­1063_en.htm
(3) In his interview for this volume, Jim Cloos (4  July 2016) attributes this 
 disappointment to a failure to cooperate closely with the Luxembourg 
 Presidency.
(4) HAEC, COM(91), Minutes No 1086.
(5) Extract from Delors’s speech to the European Parliament, 12  December 
1991: ‘1991­92 session  — Report of proceedings from 9 to 13  December 
1991’, Annex to the Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of 
the European Parliament, No 3­412, p. 232.
demonstrate that their draft proposals did not 
infringe the principle (1). The recognition that the 
EC/EU should not seek to do more than necessary 
thus assumed a degree of centrality to 
Commission thinking, a fact confirmed by the 
importance that the Santer Commission would 
attach to the slogan of ‘less but better 
legislation’ (2).
Despite its prominence, however, the idea suffered 
from a number of problems. First of all opinions 
varied significantly among the Member States 
about which areas of policy required European 
action and which were better left to national 
governments. A Commission decision in the late 
1990s to withdraw a draft directive on the 
protection of zoo animals in the name of 
subsidiarity provoked a request from the UK 
government for EU action in this field (3).
Second, as a mechanism to reassure the general 
public the concept suffered somewhat from being 
hard to define or grasp. Delors’s jest to the 
European Parliament that he should offer a prize 
for the person who came up with the most 
accessible definition pointed to a real underlying 
problem (4). It therefore became something that 
the Commission took very seriously and that 
influenced what it did and did not do during the 
last years of the century. And its emergence 
undoubtedly sheds light on the Commission’s 
growing political awareness that its activism and 
dynamism during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
could alarm as well as enthuse the European 
public. But as a solution to public doubts about EU 
power it had its limitations, a reality that probably 
helps explain the term’s gradual fall from 
prominence in the years after 2000.
Piers Ludlow
(1) Information from Nikolaus van der Pas.
(2) Interview with Jim Cloos, 4 July 2016.
(3) Information from Nikolaus van der Pas.
(4) ‘President of EU offers prize for definition of term “subsidiarity”’: 
https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/ECintheUK/president-of-eu-offers-
prize-for-definition-of-term-subsidiarity
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most  fundamentally, the pillar system, with its 
much more intergovernmental rules for foreign pol­
icy and justice and home affairs, undermined the 
fundamental unity of the EU structure and risked 
creating a serious imbalance. Indeed so serious was 
the imbalance that  Delors did not believe that it 
could endure and would have to be addressed in the 
new IGC planned for 1996: ‘Economic and mon­
etary integration will not be possible without cor­
responding democratic political integration. I am 
convinced that, even if a certain imbalance exists 
at present, monetary union will inevitably be fol­
lowed by pol itical union. How can we envisage the 
existence of a powerful independent central bank, 
controlling a currency used by 340 million people, 
without corresponding political and democratic 
developments, without having a European political 
identity?’ (1). Maastricht was an important advance, 
in other words, but its weaknesses were such that 
the effort to reform the EC/EU’s treaty base would 
need to continue (2).
By the time the 1996 IGC got under way, however, 
the context was rather less favourable. In place of 
that surge of European optimism that had char­
acterised the late 1980s and early 1990s, a more 
despondent mood had set in, marked by econom­
ic downturn across the continent, the difficult 
ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty and 
strained relations between Europe’s larger powers, 
Germany and France especially (3). Delors had also 
left the Commission, and his successor, Jacques 
Santer, was less forceful in his direction of the in­
stitution’s engagement with the IGC (4). Much of 
the negotiation was delegated to Marcelino  Oreja, 
the Spanish Commissioner, and strong presi­
dential leadership was much less apparent in the 
(1) Ibid., p. 235.
(2) The interview with Giuseppe Ciavarini Azzi (30 September 2016) confirms 
Delors’s disappointment with the treaty.
(3) The shock of the Danish ‘no’ to Maastricht is very clear from HAEC, 
COM(92), Minutes No 1108.
(4) Cloos claims that the Commission did exercise rather more influence 
‘ behind the scenes’ than was perceived at the time: interview with Jim 
Cloos, 4 July 2016.
 Commission’s internal deliberations than it had 
been under Delors (5).
The Commission’s appetite for further institution­
al change was not diminished by this more gloomy 
backdrop, however. Rather the reverse  indeed, 
as Santer made clear in his speech outlining the 
Commission’s February 1996 opinion to the Euro­
pean Parliament, since treaty reform could become 
part of the Commission’s push to counter Euro­
scepticism by making the integration process more 
relevant to the European citizen.
‘That opinion calls, first, for the creation of a citi­
zen’s Europe. To achieve this, we first need to pro­
mote the European model of society. As I see it, 
there are five requirements to be met here: strength­
ening the defence of human rights, consolidating 
the rule­of­law union, emphasizing the social as­
pect — in this context, we are calling for the social 
protocol to be reintegrated into the Treaty — and 
inserting an “employment” chapter into the Trea­
ty. This point seems to me especially crucial: fine 
speeches are all very well, but the Union must do 
more to demonstrate that it regards the fight against 
unemployment as its priority. I am well aware that 
merely including such a chapter in the Treaty will 
not in itself solve the problem. But I am convinced 
that the insertion of specific provisions will make a 
contribution to solving it’ (6).
Nor was this just a rhetorical flourish from the 
Commission President. The internal debates of the 
Commission when drafting the opinion highlight 
a widespread desire to use the IGC to address the 
perceived disconnect between the EU’s leaders and 
(5) HAEC, PV(96), Minutes No 1279, meeting of 7 February 1996; PV(96), 
Minutes No  1281, second part, 21  February 1996; PV(96), Minutes 
No 1282, second part, 28 February 1996; for Oreja’s account of his role and 
motivations see https://www.cvce.eu/obj/marcelino_oreja_reform_of_
the_eu_a_task_for_society­en­7b2ced6e­700c­4a5b­b91d­5cb8b4bdaef6.
html
(6) ‘1995/96 session — Report of proceedings from 28 to 29 February 1996’, 
Annex to the Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the 
European Parliament, No 4­476, p. 3.
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the wider European population (1). Equally central 
to the Commission’s concerns was the looming 
challenge of enlargement. This had already lurked 
in the background of the Commission’s preoccu­
pations during the Maastricht negotiations  (2). 
Five years on, with Austria, Finland and Sweden 
having already taken their place within the EU, 
and discussions about membership well under way 
with multiple central and east Euro pean states, 
it was now very clear that the EU  institutions 
(1) HAEC, PV(96), Minutes No 1279; PV(96), Minutes No 1281.
(2) Sir Leon Brittan had, for instance, referred to the prospect of future 
 enlargement: HAEC, COM(90), Minutes No 1028, second part, meeting 
of 26 September 1990, p. 14.
would have to be substantially reformed so as to 
be able to cope with the challenges of a Union 
of 25 or more Member States  (3). The ne cessary 
 changes would include much greater use of qual­
ified  majority voting, changes to the numbers of 
Commissioners and Members of the Euro pean 
Parliament and improvements in the way the 
Council presidency functioned (4). As Santer put 
it  bluntly, ‘an ill­ prepared enlargement would turn 
(3) See Chapter 20 ‘The integration of East Germany and the enlargements’.
(4) ‘1995/96 session — Report of proceedings from 28 to 29 February 1996’, 
p. 4.
On 12 and 13 December 1997 the European Council in Luxembourg officially launched the enlargement process and initiated a general 
review of the development of the European Union in order to meet the challenges on the eve of the 21st century. 
From left to right: Hans van den Broek, Commissioner for External Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Former 
Soviet Union and other European Countries, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Human Rights and External Diplomatic Missions; 
Jacques Santer, President; Jean-Claude Juncker, Luxembourg Prime Minister and acting Council President; and Jacques Poos, 
Luxembourg Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Cooperation.
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into a  nightmare what I think in reality is a histor­
ic chance for  Eur ope’ (1). 
Once more, however, the final outcome of the 
negotiations fell substantially short of the Com­
mission’s hopes. The Treaty of Amsterdam did 
incorporate substantial progress towards what 
had become known within the Commission as the 
‘Amsterdamisation of Schengen’ — in other words 
bringing into the Community proper a great deal 
of the acquis on judicial, police and other forms of 
internal cooperation that had developed outside of 
the EU (2). Santer welcomed the addition of a new 
chapter in the treaty on ‘employment’ (3), and the 
further growth in the Parliament’s powers was also 
(1) Santer’s speech on eve of Amsterdam Council: ‘1997/98 session — Report 
of proceedings from 9 to 13 June 1997’, Annex to the Official Journal of the 
European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament, No  4­502, 
p. 116.
(2) Interview with Francisco Fonseca Morillo, 15 February 2017.
(3) This had been the issue most emphasised by Santer in his letter to European 
Council members on the eve of the Amsterdam meeting: http://www.cvce.
eu/obj/letter_from_ jacques_santer_to_the_heads_of_state_or_govern­
ment_of_the_member_states_10_j une_1997­en­fec05b0a­df46­4cb9­
a400­b91e8385316a.html
seen in a positive light  (4). But the treaty fell far 
short of Commission hopes with regard to the ex­
tension of qualified majority voting, the rebalan­
cing of voting rules for qualified majority decisions 
within the Council of Ministers and the question 
of how many Commissioners there should be in 
an enlarged EU (5). If the institutions of the Euro­
pean Union were to be ready to meet the challenge 
of enlargement, a further round of treaty change 
would be needed. 
The task of preparing for what would become the 
Treaty of Nice would fall to Romano Prodi and 
his colleagues. Like Santer, but unlike Delors, the 
new President entrusted the main responsibility 
for representing the Commission’s stance at the 
IGC to one of his Commissioners, Michel  Barnier. 
The College as a whole, however, continued to 
review the issue on frequent occasions  (6). And 
the Commission’s starting position was firm. As 
 Prodi made clear at the IGC’s opening ceremony 
in February 2000, ‘we cannot expand from 15 to 
28 members simply by patching things up. Deci­
sive solutions must be found, otherwise the Union 
can only get weaker. For example, I genuinely be­
lieve that, with 28 members, any areas that are still 
decided by unanimity will be condemned to stag­
nation’  (7). The President returned to the charge 
in October, warning of the dangers of creeping 
intergovernmentalism and reiterating that an EU 
(4) See Santer’s speech at the signing ceremony in October: Speech/97/200, 
‘Speech by Jacques Santer, President of the European Commission: 
 Signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam’, Amsterdam, 2  October 1997: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press­release_SPEECH­97­200_fr.htm
(5) The most detailed assessment of the treaty is in Michel Petite’s note to the 
members of the Commission: HAEU, DORIE 540, SEC(97) 1411, 7 July 
1997, ‘Note for the members of the Commission’.
(6) HAEC, PV(2000), Minutes No  1463, meeting of 26  January 2000; 
PV(2000), Minutes No  1470, 14  March 2000; PV(2000), Minutes 
No  1471, 21  March 2000; PV(2000), Minutes No  1487, 12  July 2000; 
PV(2000), Minutes No  1492, 20  September 2000; PV(2000), Minutes 
No 1494, 4 October 2000; PV(2000), Minutes No 1498, 31 October 2000; 
PV(2000), Minutes No  1501, 22  November 2000; PV(2000), Minutes 
No 1503, 6 December 2000.
(7) Speech/00/40, ‘Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission: 
Opening of the IGC’, General Affairs Council, Brussels, 14 February 2000: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press­release_SPEECH­00­40_en.htm
‘Waiting for Santa Claus’. 
After the disappointment of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Romano 
Prodi, Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac hoped that Christmas 
would bring them success in institutional reform in Nice 
in December 2000.
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that failed to advance would actually be one that 
moved backwards (1).
For the third time in succession, though, the 
Commission would react with disappointment at 
the eventual treaty outcome. Some progress was 
made with the Treaty of Nice, including a signifi­
cant change to the manner in which the Com­
mission President was selected (the appointment 
would now require majority support, rather than 
unanimity as had previously been the case, there­
by preventing a repeat of the United Kingdom’s 
blocking of Jean­Luc Dehaene in 1994  (2)) and 
an increase in their powers. There were also some 
welcome provisions on enhanced cooperation  — 
in other words the ability of some Member States 
to move ahead further and faster in some policy 
 areas, without needing to wait for all of the Mem­
ber States to be ready — and a strengthening of EU 
commercial policy. But several of the key  decisions 
(1) Speech/00/352, ‘Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission: 
Plenary Session of the European Parliament’, Strasbourg, 3 October 2000: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press­release_SPEECH­00­352_en.htm
(2) See Chapter 1.1 ‘Three men, one job: the presidency of the European 
 Commission’.
were ducked, while the solution arrived at on vote 
weighting was seen as a retrograde step, not a for­
ward movement. Prodi’s conclusion was clear: ‘the 
experience of Nice shows that the current method 
of reviewing the Treaties is no longer a valid one. 
Like the Community structure itself, the process 
for producing institutional change is under stress, 
and needs to be changed’ (3). Lessons, he suggest­
ed, should be drawn from the approach adopted 
when drawing up the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, where rather than 
a traditional IGC the task had been given to a 
body on which sat representatives of the European 
Parliament and of national parliaments, of govern­
ments and of the Commission (4). Treaty revision 
would go on being necessary, but a new approach 
was needed.
Piers Ludlow
(3) Speech/00/499, ‘Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European 
Commission: Speech at the European Parliament on the European Council 
of Nice’, Strasbourg, 12  December 2000: http://europa.eu/rapid/press­ 
release_SPEECH­00­499_en.htm
(4) See interview with Francisco Fonseca Morillo (15 February 2017) for recol­
lections about the drafting of the charter.
